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Abstract—We analyze the effect of sponsored data platforms
when Internet service providers (ISPs) compete for subscribers
and content providers (CPs) compete for a share of the bandwidth
usage by the customers. Our analytical model is of a full
information, leader-follower game. ISPs lead and set prices for
sponsorship. CPs then make the binary decision of sponsoring or
not sponsoring their content on the ISPs. Lastly, based on both of
these, users make a two-part decision of choosing the ISP to which
they subscribe, and the amount of data to consume from each of
the CPs through the chosen ISP. User consumption is determined
by a utility maximization framework, the sponsorship decision is
determined by a non-cooperative game between the CPs, and the
ISPs set their prices to maximize their profit in response to the
prices set by the competing ISP. We analyze the pricing dynamics
of the prices set by the ISPs, the sponsorship decisions that the
CPs make and the market structure therein, and the surpluses
of the ISPs, CPs, and users.
This is the first analysis of the effect sponsored data platforms
in the presence of ISP competition. We show that inter-ISP
competition does not inhibit ISPs from extracting a significant
fraction of the CP surplus. Moreover, the ISPs often have an
incentive to significantly skew the CP marketplace in favor of
the most profitable CP.
I. INTRODUCTION
Market segmentation and discriminatory pricing are well
known techniques [1], [2] that ISPs can use to increase
revenues. A combination of inter-ISP competition and market
expectations have rendered such schemes to be not so prevalent
on the user side. Regulatory issues have also prevented the use
of many smart data pricing schemes. However, sponsored data
or zero-rating is a price discrimination technique that is being
introduced by ISPs in many markets as a consumer friendly
innovation and is gaining increased adaptation. In this scheme,
the content provider (CP) pays the ISP charges for its content
that is consumed by the users while the users do not pay the
ISP charges for the same.
Regulatory response to sponsored data, or zero-rating, has
been varied. In many countries, it is deemed to violate net
neutrality regulations and is hence banned, e.g., Canada,
Brazil, India, Chile, Sweden, Hungary. In many other countries
it is allowed alongside net neutrality regulations that disallow
discriminatory QoS schemes, e.g., USA, UK, Netherlands,
Germany [3]. In fact, BEREC guidelines stipulate a case by
case analysis when zero rating is a purely pricing practice,
and leaves it to the national regulatory authorities. Wherever
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allowed, it is expected that such schemes will become more
prevalent and many companies are making plans to enter this
23 billion dollar market1. AT&T is revamping its Data Perks
program to offer free DirecTV and other video services2,
Verizon is offering AOL Gameday and Hearst magazines via
its FreeBee program3 and T-Mobile has been offering free
music on BingeOn. There are also third party providers for
such services, e.g., Aquto4.
In this paper we study the effect of such services on
the content provider market and on the surpluses of various
stakeholders.
A. Previous work
The economics of discrimination and its effect on mar-
ket structures, on investment incentives, and on stakeholder
surpluses have been widely studied. In the provisioning of
Internet service, one version of discrimination is called QoS
discrimination. This is effected either by providing fast lanes
for preferred CPs or by giving them transmission priorities or
a combination of the two. The effect of QoS discrimination
is analyzed in, e.g., [4], [5], [6]. With QoS discrimination,
the improved quality of experience drives users toward the
preferred CPs. Our interest in this paper is in price discrimi-
nation effected through a sponsorship program or a zero-rating
platform. In this scheme, the content of the sponsoring or
zero-rated CPs is free to the user while the user pays for the
content from the non sponsoring CPs. Here, cheaper prices
drives users towards sponsored or zero-rated content. (In the
rest of the paper we will use the terms sponsored data and
zero-rating interchangeably.) Examples of work that address
price discrimination are [7], [8], [9], [10], [11], [12]. In [7],
[8], one ISP and one CP interact in a Stackelberg game. Two
CPs and one ISP are considered in [9], [10], [11], [12], [13],
[14]. These papers differ in the interaction between the agents,
the consumption model for the users, and the manner in which
sponsorship is effected. However, the key conclusion in all of
them is qualitatively similar—as the revenue rate of the CPs
increase, the ISP can achieve higher profits than in the case
where sponsorship is not allowed. Further, CPs with lower
revenue rate possibly lose more on their surplus either due
1https://www.mobilemarketer.com/ex/mobilemarketer/
cms/news/research/20919.html
2https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/20/17032550/
att-prepaid-plans-sponsored-data
3https://www.theverge.com/2016/1/19/10789522/
verizon-freebee-sponsored-data-net-neutrality
4http://www.aquto.com/
to sponsorship costs, or due to competition with free content.
This can make them become less profitable in the short term
and potentially nonviable in the long term.
All of the preceding work considered only one ISP and
this begs the natural question: Would ISP competition reduce
the ability of the ISPs to extract the CP surplus? Specifically,
would the ISPs be as powerful as the models that use only
one ISP indicate. Surprisingly, the answer is in the affirmative,
albeit with some qualifications.
We mention here that the only prior work that we are aware
of that considers zero-rating with ISP-competition is [15]. This
is a purely numerical study, where the strategic interaction
between the competing ISPs and the resulting equilibria are
not considered.
B. Preview
In the next section we set up the notation and the model for
the leader-follower game involving two ISPs as leaders, two
CPs following the ISPs, and a continuum of users following
the CPs. We begin by describing the user behavior for a given
set of ISP prices and CP sponsorships. This is then used to
determine the market share of the ISPs. We then describe the
how the CPs make the sponsorship decision for a given set of
prices from the ISPs. Finally, the determination of the prices
by the ISPs is also detailed.
In Section III we derive the best response strategies of one
ISP for a given set of prices and the sponsorship configuration
of the CPs on the competing ISP. The key contribution in this
section is that
• there is a threshold on CP profitability beyond which the
ISP will price its data sponsorship service such that at
least one of the CPs will sponsor its data, and
• at least one of the CPs has less surplus than it would
have had if the ISP did not operate a data sponsorship
program.
In Section IV, we use the results of the previous section to
have the ISPs sequentially determine their best response prices
in response to the sponsorship configuration on the competing
ISP, in a taˆtonnement-like iterative process. The following are
the key contributions in this section.
• For a wide range of parameter sets, we find that numer-
ically, the iterative process does converge to an equi-
librium rather quickly. Further, at equilibrium the CPs
choose the same configuration on both the ISPs.
• In some cases, the equilibrium configuration is the same
as that in the case where each ISP acts as a monopoly. As
a result, the ISPs are unaffected by inter-ISP competition,
and both ISPs are able to extract a fraction of the CP-side
surplus. At least one CP, and sometimes both CPs, end
up worse off in the process, compared to the scenario
where data sponsorship is not permitted.
• In some cases, inter-ISP competition results in a pris-
oner’s dilemma, causing both ISPs to induce a sub-
optimal sponsorship configuration. However, this does not
necessarily result in a benefit for CPs. At least one CP,
and sometimes both CPs, still end up worse off, compared
to the scenario where data sponsorship is not permitted.
Finally, in Section V we consider asymmetric stickiness of
the customers and see that this does not qualitatively change
our conclusions above.
We conclude with a discussion and some policy prescrip-
tions in Section VI. The key input to policy planners from the
preceding is that although ISP and CP competition can provide
price stability, data sponsorship practices enable ISPs to extract
a substantial portion of CP surplus—importantly, this ability
is not diminished by inter-ISP competition. The resulting
asymmetry of benefits drives smaller CPs towards significantly
lower profitability and possibly exiting the market. Thus, while
data sponsorship may provide improved surplus to users in
the short run, it can also diminish competition in the CP
marketplace.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider two competing ISPs and two competing CPs.
Each ISP operates a zero-rating platform, and CPs have the
option of sponsoring their content by joining the zero-rating
platform of one or both ISPs. ISP j (j ∈ {1, 2}) charges pj
dollars per unit of data to its subscribers and a sponsoring
charge of qj dollars per unit of data on CPs that zero-rate
their content.5 CPs derive their revenue via advertisements;
CP i (i ∈ {1, 2}) makes a revenue of ai dollars per unit of
data consumed by users. Users subscribe to exactly one of the
two ISPs and consume content of the CPs through that ISP.
Further, the volume of user consumption is determined by the
ISP charges and the utility obtained.
We capture the strategic interaction between the users, CPs,
and ISPs via a three-tier leader follower model:
1) ISPs ‘lead’ by setting sponsorship charges. For sim-
plicity, we assume that user charges are equal, i.e.,
p1 = p2 = p, and are exogenously determined.
6
2) CPs respond to sponsorship charges by making the bi-
nary decision of whether or not to sponsor their content
on each ISP.
3) Finally, the user base responds to the actions of the
CPs by determining the fraction of subscribers of each
ISP. Moreover, subscribers of each ISP determine their
consumption of each CP’s content.
In the following, we describe in detail our behavior model of
the user base, followed by our models for the behavior of the
CPs and the ISPs. Proofs of the results stated in this section
can be found in Appendix A.
A. User behavior
We begin by describing the consumption profile of users of
ISP j (j ∈ {1, 2}), and subsequently describe how the market
split across ISPs is determined
5Such usage-based pricing is prevalent in the mobile Internet space [16].
6Indeed, in many markets, user expectations and inter-ISP competition have
driven user-side pricing to be flat across providers.
Behavior of users of ISP j: Let N = {1, 2} denote the set
of CPs. The set of sponsoring CPs on ISP j is denoted by Sj
andOj = N\Sj denotes the set of non-sponsoring CPs on ISP
j. We denote the configurations Sj = ∅, Sj = {1}, Sj = {2},
and Sj = {1, 2} by NN, SN, NS and SS respectively.
We assume that users derive a utility of ψi(θ) from con-
suming θ bytes of data from CP i within a billing cycle. Here,
ψi(·) : R+ → R+ is a continuously differentiable, concave and
strictly increasing function. We further assume that each user
has a ‘capacity to consume’ c bytes, which is the maximum
amount of data (across both CPs) a user can consume in a
billing cycle. Let θi,j denote the consumption of CP i content
by users of ISP j. Thus, we take θj = (θi,j , i ∈ N ) to be the
unique solution of the following optimization.
max
z=(z1,z2)
∑
i∈N ψi(zi)− p
∑
i∈Oj
zi
s.t.
∑
i∈N zi ≤ c, z ≥ 0
(1)
The first term in the objective function above is the utility
derived from content consumption, and the second term is
the price paid by the user to ISP j for the consumption
of non-sponsored content. Since p is assumed to be deter-
mined exogenously, it follows that the solution of the above
optimization depends only on the sponsorship configuration
Mj ∈ {NN,SN,NS,SS} on ISP j. We sometimes write the
solution of (1) as θMj = (θ
Mj
i , i ∈ N ) to emphasize this
dependence. We denote the optimal value of (1) by uMj .
Throughout this paper, we make the assumption that the
two CPs are substitutable, i.e., ψ1(·) = ψ2(·) = ψ(·);
this simplifies notation and also enables us to highlight the
impact of zero-rating in skewing the user consumption profile.7
However, several of our results (including those stated in
Section III, along with Theorems 2 and 3 in Section IV)
generalize for ψ1(·) 6= ψ2(·). Under the CP-substitutability
assumption, it is easy to see that the surpluses of users of
ISP j under different sponsorship configurations are sorted as
follows.
Lemma 1. uSS ≥ uSN = uNS ≥ uNN .
Finally, we note the following consequence of the above
consumption model.
Lemma 2. For any sponsorship configurationM, and for i ∈
N , θSN2 = θ
NS
1 ≤ θ
M
i .
Having described the content consumption profile of users
of each ISP, we now describe how the user base gets divided
across the ISPs. Toward that, we assume that the users can
change their ISP subscription at any time.
Market split across ISPs: We model the distribution of users
between ISPs using the Hotelling model [17]. Let x = xM2M1
denote the fraction of the user base subscribed to ISP 1. Under
the Hotelling model, xM2M1 is the solution of the equation
uM1 − txM2M1 = u
M2 − t(1− xM2M1 ), (2)
7We do however explicitly capture asymmetry in the CP revenue rates aj .
Indeed, different CPs that offer comparable services may differ in their ability
generate ad revenue.
where t > 0 is a parameter of the model. This equation
may interpreted as follows: We imagine the users as being
distributed uniformly over the unit interval [0, 1]. ISP 1 is
located at the left end-point of this interval, and ISP 2 is
located at the right end-point. A user at position x ∈ [0, 1]
incurs a (virtual) transportation cost of tx to connect to ISP 1,
and a (virtual) transportation cost t(1 − x) to connect to
ISP 2. Since each (non-atomic) user connects to the ISP
that provides the higher payoff (surplus minus transportation
cost), the market split is determined by (2). Note that the
transportation cost captures the inherent stickiness of users to a
certain ISP; users located in the left (respectively, right) half of
the interval have an inherent preference for ISP 1 (respectively,
ISP 2).8 Moreover, a higher value of t implies increased user
stickiness. To ensure a meaningful solution to (2), we assume
that t > uSS − uNN . It then follows that the market share of
ISP 1 is given by
xM2M1 =
uM1 − uM2 + t
2t
. (3)
Note that the Hotelling model has been extensively used in
many similar situations, including in the modeling of ISPs,
e.g., [5]. Further, a generalization is considered in Section V
where we will assume that the stickiness of the users is not
symmetric, i.e., the t is different for different ISPs.
We conclude by collecting some immediate consequences
of the Hotelling model.
Lemma 3. For any given sponsorship configuration M2
on ISP2, the market market share of ISP1 under different
sponsorship configurations are related as follows:
xM2NN ≤ x
M2
SN = x
M2
NS ≤ x
M2
SS .
This lemma is an immediate consequence of Lemma 1
and (3).
Lemma 4. As t → ∞, for any given sponsorship configura-
tions M1 and M2 on ISPs 1 and 2, x
M2
M1
→ 0.5.
The above lemma, which is a direct consequence of (3),
states that as user stickiness grows, the market shares of the
ISPs become insensitive to their sponsorship configurations
and approach a symmetric market split. In other words, as
t → ∞, the churn of users between ISPs diminishes, and
each ISP can be thought of as a monopoly.
B. CP behavior
In this subsection, we describe our model of CP behavior.
Recall that in our leader-follower model, CPs lead the users
and follow the ISPs, i.e., they decide whether on not to sponsor
their content on ISPs 1 and 2 based on sponsorship charges
announced by the ISPs, knowing ex-ante that the user base
will respond to their actions based on the model presented in
Section II-A. Since each CP seeks to maximize its own profit,
8In practice, user stickiness may result from many considerations like
inertia, high lead time to switch ISPs, and familiarity with the features and
services offered by one’s present ISP.
it is natural to capture the outcome of their interaction as a
Nash equilibrium.
Note that in general, each CP may choose to either sponsor
or not sponsor its content on each ISP. This means that there
are four possible actions per CP, and sixteen possible sponsor-
ship configurations in all. To avoid the resulting analytical (and
notational) complexity, we make the following simplifying
assumption.
Assumption 1. The CPs can only reconsider their sponsorship
decision on a single ISP at a time.
Assumption 1 is natural if there is a contractually binding
period associated with the decision to sponsor one’s content
on an ISP, say ISP 1, with the opportunity to form (or renew)
a sponsorship contract with ISP 1 arising periodically and out
of sync with similar opportunities to sponsor on ISP 2.
Under Assumption 1, it is meaningful to ask the question:
Given a sponsorship configuration M2 ∈ {NN,SN,NS,SS} on
ISP 2, when is M1 ∈ {NN,SN,NS,SS} a Nash equilibrium
sponsorship configuration on ISP 1? In the remainder of this
section, we address this question.
Consider an arbitrary sponsorship M2 configuration on
ISP 2. If CP 1 chooses to sponsor its content on ISP 1, its
surplus is given by
x(a1 − q1)θ1,1 + (1− x)
[
(a1 − q2)θ1,21{M2∈{SS,SN}}
+ a1θ1,21{M2∈{NS,NN}}
]
.
The first term above captures the surpluses from ISP 1
(revenue from ISP 1 users minus the sponsorship charge paid
to ISP 1). Note that this term contains the market share of
ISP 1 as a factor; also recall that we take the ‘volume’ of the
user base to be unity. The second term captures the surplus of
CP 1 from ISP 2. Similarly, if CP 2 chooses not to sponsor
its content on ISP 1, its surplus is given by
xa1θ1,1 + (1− x)
[
(a1 − q2)θ1,21{M2∈{SS,SN}}
+ a1θ1,21{M2∈{NS,NN}}
]
.
It is important to note that in the above equations, x, θ1,1
and θ1,2 depend on the actions of both CPs. The conditions
for the different sponsorship configurations on ISP 1 to be a
Nash equilibrium are derived in Appendix A.
C. ISP behavior
We now describe our model for ISP behavior. ISPs
derive their revenue from two sources: from users (sub-
scribers) for the consumption of non-sponsored con-
tent, and from CPs for the consumption of spon-
sored content. Thus, the surplus of ISP 1 is given by
x
[∑
i∈S1
qiθi,1 +
∑
i∈O1
pθi,1
]
, whereas that of ISP 2 is
given by (1 − x)
[∑
i∈S2
qiθi,2 +
∑
i∈O2
pθi,2
]
.
The ISPs, being leaders of the three-tier leader-follower
interaction, set sponsorship prices as to induce the most
profitable Nash equilibrium among CPs on their zero-rating
platform. Specifically, we assume that given a sponsorship
configuration on, say ISP 2, when ISP 1 sets the sponsorship
price on its zero-rating platform, the most profitable (for ISP 1)
Nash equilibrium between the CPs on its platform emerges.9
Note that in our model, the impact of the action of any ISP
depends on the prevailing sponsorship configuration on the
other. In other words, the interaction between the ISPs has
memory.
We define the tuple (q1,M1, q2,M2) to be a system equi-
librium if, for j ∈ {1, 2},10
1) Given sponsorship configurationM−j on ISP −j, Mj is
the most profitable Nash equilibrium (among the CPs)
for ISP j under action qj .
2) Given sponsorship configuration M−j on ISP −j, the
surplus of ISP j is maximized under action qj .
Note that under a system equilibrium, neither ISP has the
incentive to unilaterally deviate from its action. Moreover,
neither CP has the unilateral incentive to deviate from its spon-
sorship decision on one ISP given the prevailing sponsorship
configuration on the other ISP.11
In Section III, we explore the optimal response of ISP 1
given a prevailing sponsorship configuration on ISP 2. Then,
in Section IV, we investigate system equilibria by simulating
best response dynamics between the ISPs.
III. ISP’S BEST RESPONSE STRATEGY
In this section, we assume a fixed sponsorship configuration
M2 on ISP 2, and analyze the optimal strategy for ISP 1. This
optimal strategy involves setting the sponsorship charge q1 so
as to induce the most profitable Nash equilibrium between the
CPs on its zero-rating platform. We also study the impact of
ISP 1’s optimal strategy on the surplus of both ISPs, both CPs,
and the user base.
The analysis of this section sheds light on the behavior
we might expect from an ISP in a competitive marketplace.
Indeed, the case M2 = NN can also be thought as capturing
the scenario where one ISP (ISP 1) operates a zero-rating
platform, whereas the other (ISP 2) does not. Such a situation
can happen when the competing ISP is slow to act; e.g.,
Sprint announced its zero rating service much later than its
competitors. Moreover, the analysis of this section captures
one step in the alternating best response dynamics we consider
in the following section, providing insights into the observed
system equilibria.
For notational simplicity, throughout this section, we take
M2 = NN. Our results easily generalize to arbitraryM2. As in
[12], we find it instructive to analyze ISP 1’s optimal strategy
in the scaling regime of growing CP revenue rates. After all, it
is when CP revenue rates are large that ISPs have the incentive
to offer zero-rating opportunities, so as to extract some of the
9Note that if the action of an ISP allows for multiple Nash equilibria
between the CPs (as per Lemma 9), we assume the ISP is able to induce
the most profitable equilibrium. This is a standard approach for handling
non-unique follower equilibria in leader-follower interactions [18].
10For any ISP j, we use the label −j to refer to the other ISP.
11This is a weak notion of equilibrium, in the sense that it does not
guarantee that CPs do not have the incentive to reverse their sponsoring
decisions on both ISPs. However, we prove in Section IV that the system
equilibria we observe do indeed possess this guarantee; see Theorems 3 and 4.
CP-side surplus. Specifically, we consider (a1, a2) = (a, ρa),
where a > 0 is a scaling parameter and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is fixed.
When ρ is small, this corresponds to the scenario where CP 1
has a considerably greater ability to monetize its content than
CP 2, although their services are comparable from a user
standpoint. As we shall see in this section and the next, the
outcomes corresponding to this case differ considerably from
the outcomes when ρ ≈ 1, i.e., the CPs are comparable in
their ability to monetize their content.The proofs of the results
claimed in this section can be found in the appendix.
The following theorem sheds light on the sponsorship
configurations induced by ISP 1 in the regime of growing CP
revenue rates.
Theorem 1. [ISP 1’s profit maximizing strategy] Let
(a1, a2) = (a, ρa) where a > 0, and fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1). There
exists a threshold as > 0 such that
1) For a ≤ as, ISP 1 enforces an NN equilibrium.
2) For a ≥ as, ISP 1 enforces an SN/SS equilibrium.
Theorem 1 shows that when the revenue rates of both CPs
are small, ISP 1 favors an NN configuration, since charging
users is more profitable than charging the CPs. When the
revenue rates cross a certain threshold, ISP 1 induces an SN/SS
equilibrium depending on the values of a and ρ. Specifically,
if ρ is small, i.e., CP 1 has a considerably higher revenue rate
than CP 2, then ISP 1 favors an SN configuration. Indeed,
in this case, it is in the interest of ISP 1 to skew user-side
consumption in favor of CP 1, thanks to the greater potential
for sponsorship revenue from CP 1 compared to CP 2. On the
other hand, when ρ ≈ 1, ISP 1 favors an SS configuration for
large enough a. The proof of Theorem 1 (see Appendix B)
also highlights the precise conditions for different optimal
strategies for ISP 1.
Next, we note that the threshold on CP revenue rates for
sponsorship to be profitable for ISP 1 shrinks as user stickiness
decreases. This is because when user stickiness is small (i.e.,
t is small), ISP 1 sees a sharp growth in its subscriber base
once sponsorship kicks in.
Lemma 5. Let (a1, a2) = (a, ρa) where a > 0, and fixed
ρ ∈ (0, 1). The sponsorship threshold aS defined in Theorem 1
is an increasing function of t.
Our next result highlights the benefit to ISP 1 from zero-
rating.
Lemma 6. [ISP 1 surplus] Let (a1, a2) = (a, ρa) where a >
0, and fixed ρ ∈ (0, 1). Under the optimal strategy for ISP1
(given by Theorem 1), the profit rI(a) of ISP 1 varies with a
as follows.
1) rI(a) is constant over a ≤ as.
2) For a > as, rI(a) is a strictly increasing, super linear
function of a, i.e., there exist constants ν > 0 and κ
such that rI(a) ≥ νa+ κ for a > as.
Note that for a > as, ISP 1 profit grows at least linearly
in a, implying that ISP 1 is able to extract a fraction of the
CP revenues by optimally setting the sponsorship charge on
its zero-rating platform.
Next, we turn to CP-side surplus. As the following lemma
shows, the zero-rating platform leaves at least one CP worse
off.
Lemma 7. [CP surplus] Under the optimal strategy for ISP1
(given by Theorem 1), the following statements hold.
1) When ISP 1 induces an SN equilibrium, CP 1 makes the
same profit as it would make under an NN configuration
(or equivalently, without the zero rating platform on
ISP 1). On the other hand, CP 2 makes a profit less
than or equal to that it would make under an NN
configuration.
2) Under an SS equilibrium, at least one of the CPs makes
a profit less than or equal to that it would make under
an NN configuration.
Finally, we note that since zero-rating increases user surplus
(see Lemma 1), it is clear that the surplus of subscribers of
ISP 1, and also the aggregate surplus of the user base, is
increased for a > aS .
To summarize, the results in this section show that so long
as the CP revenue rates are large enough, ISP 1 can set the
sponsorship charges on its zero-rating platform so as to extract
a considerable fraction of CP-side surplus, leaving one or both
the CPs worse off. Moreover, ISP 1 also benefits from the
growth of its subscriber base that results from the increased
utility afforded to its users from sponsorship.
We illustrate the results of this section with a numerical
example. Specifically, we take ψ(θ) = log(1 + θ), p = 0.35,
c = 4, t = 3 and ρ = 0.7. Figure 1 shows the surplus of the
ISPs and CPs as a function of a. Note that for intermediate
values of a, ISP 1 induces an SN equilibrium, and for larger
values of a, ISP 1 induces an SS equilibrium. Moreover, in
the SS configuration, both CPs are worse off compared to the
NN configuration (the profit under NN can be visualized by
extending the linear growth in profit for small a). This can be
thought of as a prisoner’s dilemma between the CPs. Finally,
note that ISP 2 surplus shrinks once ISP 1 induces an SN
configuration, and shrinks further when ISP 1 induces an SS
configuration.
While the present section only considers the strategic be-
havior of a single ISP, in the following section, we seek to
capture the strategic interaction between the ISPs.
IV. EQUILIBRIA OF BEST RESPONSE DYNAMICS
The goal of this section is to study the strategic interaction
between the ISPs, each ISP seeking to maximize its own profit.
Since a characterization of the system equilibria associated
with the three-tier interaction between the ISPs, the CPs, and
the users is not analytically feasible (except in two limiting
regimes; see Theorems 3 and 4), we explore the system
equilibria obtained by simulating alternating best response dy-
namics between the ISPs, i.e., the ISPs alternatively play their
optimal response to the prevailing sponsorship configuration
on the other ISP. (The results of the previous section shed light
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Fig. 1: Surplus of various entities in the system as a function
of a when ISP2 is in NN configuration.
on this optimal response.) These dynamics capture a myopic
interaction between competing ISPs. Note that an equilibrium
of these dynamics, i.e., a configuration where neither ISP
adapts its action, is also a system equilibrium as defined in
Section II-C. In this section, we analyze the properties of
these equilibria (when they exist), highlighting the resulting
sponsorship configurations, and also the surplus of the various
parties.
Our numerical experiments yield two interesting observa-
tions:
• The alternating best response dynamics either converge
quickly (in 5 to 8 rounds) or (in some cases) oscillate
indefinitely.
• When the dynamics do converge, the equilibrium is
symmetric, i.e., of the form (q,M, q,M).
This last observation leads us to analyze the implications of
symmetric system equilibria:
Theorem 2. Under any symmetric system equilibrium of the
form (q,M, q,M), the following holds.
1) If M ∈ {SN,NS}, then the CP that sponsors on both
ISPs makes the same profit as it would if zero-rating
were not permitted. On the other hand, the CP that does
not sponsor on both ISPs makes a profit less than or
equal to that it would if zero-rating were not permitted.
2) If M = SS, at least one of the CPs makes a profit less
than or equal to that it would make if zero-rating were
not permitted.
Theorem 2 highlights that under any symmetric system
equilibrium, at least one of the CPs is worse off, compared to
the case where zero-rating is not permitted. In the absence of
inter-ISP competition, a similar observation was made in [12];
Theorem 2 highlights that competition at the ISP level does
not necessarily translate to improved surplus at the CP level.
The proof of Theorem 2 is presented in Appendix F.
We now report the results of our numerical experiments.
Throughout, we use ψ(θ) = log(1 + θ). We set the initial
configuration on ISP 2 to be NN, and allow ISP 1 to play
first (although we observe that the limiting behavior of the
dynamics is robust to the initial condition).
A. Equilibrium sponsorship configurations
We first report the (experimentally observed) limiting spon-
sorship configurations from the best response dynamics over
the a1 × a2 space. Interestingly, in all cases, we observe that
the equilibrium (when the dynamics converge) is symmetric
across the ISPs, i.e., both ISPs arrive at the same sponsorship
configuration. Moreover, these equilibrium configurations have
the same structural dependence on a1 and a2 as we saw in
the ‘single-step best response’ characterization in Section III;
see Figure 2(a). When a1 and a2 are small, the equilibrium
involves both ISPs in an NN configuration, as expected.
Moreover, when a1 ≫ a2 or a2 ≫ a1, both ISPs arrive at an
equilibrium wherein the more profitable CP sponsors. Finally,
when a1 and a2 are comparable and large enough, both ISPs
induce both CPs to sponsor. We also observe that there are
certain intermediate regions in the a1 × a2 space where the
best response dynamics oscillate.
Next, we compare the limiting behavior of the best response
dynamics for different values of the transportation cost param-
eter t; see Figures 2(a)–2(c). Recall that increasing t implies
increasing user stickiness, and thus a diminishing dependence
of one ISP’s action on the other. Note that as t grows, the
region of the a1 × a2 where the ISPs induce one or both
CPs to sponsor shrinks. Interestingly, this is the result of a
prisoner’s dilemma between the ISPs: When t is small, i.e.,
when inter-ISP user churn is significant, each ISP has the
unilateral incentive to induce sponsorship even at small CP
revenue rates, to benefit from the resulting increase in its
subscriber base. However, once one ISP induces sponsorship,
the other ISP is also incentivised to induce sponsorship to
recover its lost market share. As a result, the ISPs arrive at an
equilibrium that leaves them both worse off; this will also be
apparent from the plots of ISP surplus reported later.
On the other hand, when t is large, then each ISP’s market
share is relatively insensitive to the other’s actions, and so the
ISPs induce sponsorship only when it is mutually beneficial for
them to do so. This also explains why as t becomes large, the
region of the a1×a2 space where the best response dynamics
oscillate diminishes.
Finally, we compare the limiting behavior of the best
response dynamics for different values of the ‘capacity to
consume’ c; see Figures 3(a)–3(c). Note that when c is small,
there is only a modest growth in user-side consumption from
zero-rating. As a result, the equilibrium is NN on both ISPs
except when the CP revenue rates are really large. On the other
hand, when c is large, ISPs induce sponsoring even at moderate
revenue rates to benefit from the increased data consumption
from the users.
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Fig. 2: Limiting sponsorship configurations as a function of a1, a2 with c = 4 and varying t. (a) t = 3 (b) t = 10 (c) t = 1000
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Fig. 3: Limiting sponsorship configurations as a function of a1, a2 with t = 3 and varying c. (a) c = 1 (b) c = 4 (c) c = 40
B. Surplus
Having explored the equilibrium sponsorship configurations
that result from alternating best response dynamics between
ISPs, we now consider the equilibrium surplus realized by
the ISPs, the CPs, and the users. Since a 3-d visualization
of surplus in the a1 × a2 space is hard to interpret, we use
the parameterization (a1, a2) = (a, ρa) for ρ ∈ (0, 1) (as in
Section III). We first consider the case when ρ is small (i.e.,
CP2’s revenue/byte is much less than that of CP1) and then
the case where ρ is close to 1 (i.e., the revenue rates of both
CPs are comparable).
Small ρ : Figure 4 shows the surplus of the ISPs (recall
that since the equilibria we observe are symmetric across the
ISPs, both ISPs obtain the same surplus), CP1, CP2, and the
user base as a function of a for ρ = 0.1 and t = 3. From
Figure 2(a), it is clear that in this case, both ISPs induce
an NN equilibrium for a less than a certain threshold, and
an SN equilibrium beyond this threshold. We benchmark the
equilibrium surplus under our model (ISP duopoly) with case
where users are infinitely sticky (i.e., each ISP operates as a
monopoly) and the case where neither ISP operates a zero-
rating platform.
As was observed in Section IV-A, competition forces both
ISPs to induce an SN configuration for smaller values of a as
compared to the monopoly setting (t → ∞). This is evident
from the lower threshold (in a) for sponsorship as compared
to the monopoly setting. This prisoner’s dilemma between the
ISPs causes both ISPs to obtain a smaller profit compared
with the monopoly case for intermediate values of a; see
Figure 4(a). For larger values of a however, the each ISP’s
surplus matches that in the monopoly case. The surplus of
the CP 1 (the sponsoring CP) remains the same under all
three models, in line with the conclusion of Theorem 2; see
Figure 4(b). On the other hand, CP 2 (the non-sponsoring CP)
is worse off due to zero-rating, also in line with Theorem 2; see
Figure 4(c). Finally, we note that user surplus gets enhanced
due to zero-rating, as expected; see Figure 4(d).
To summarize, we observe that except for intermediate
values of a, where competition forces both ISPs to induce
sponsorship prematurely, the surplus of all parties matches
that in the monopoly case: the ISPs are able to extract a
considerable fraction of CP surplus, and neither CP benefits
from zero-rating. Indeed, as we prove below, for large enough
a and small enough ρ the monopoly configuration is indeed a
system equilibrium in our duopoly model.
Theorem 3. Let (a1, a2) = (a, ρa) for ρ ∈ (0, 1). There exist
thresholds aSN > 0 and ρSN > 0 such that for a > aSN and
ρ < ρSN , there exists q(a) such that:
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Fig. 4: Surplus of various entities for c = 4, t = 3, p = 0.35 and ρ = 0.1 as a function of a. (a) ISP revenue (b) CP1 revenue
(c) CP2 revenue (d) User surplus
1) (q(a), SN, q(a), SN) is a system equilibrium. Under this
configuration, neither CP has the unilateral incentive to
reverse its sponsorship decision on both ISPs. Moreover,
CP 1 makes the same profit as it would in the absence of
the zero-rating platforms, whereas CP 2 makes a profit
less than or equal to that it would in the absence of the
zero-rating platforms.
2) In the monopoly setting (t → ∞), it is optimal for
each ISP to induce an SN equilibrium by setting its
sponsorship charge equal to q(a).
Note that Theorem 3 does not prove that for large enough
a and small enough ρ, the best response dynamics converge
to the stated configuration. It merely establishes that the
configuration that the best response dynamics converge to in
our experiments is indeed a system equilibrium. In fact, it
proves that the observed configuration is an equilibrium in a
stronger sense, in that neither CP has the incentive to switch
its sponsorship decisions across both ISP platforms. The proof
of Theorem 3 is presented in Appendix G.
Large ρ : Next, we consider the case where ρ = 0.8. Figure 5
shows the surplus of various entities as a function of a. From
Figure 2(a), it is clear that in this case, both ISPs induce an
NN equilibrium for a less than a certain threshold, and an SS
equilibrium beyond this threshold.
As before, we observe a prisoner’s dilemma between the
ISPs for intermediate values of a, where the ISP’s enter into a
mutually sub-optimal sponsorship equilibrium; see Figure 5(a).
However, for larger values of a, each ISP’s surplus matches
that in the monopoly setting. Interestingly, this case also
represents a prisoner’s dilemma between the CPs, wherein
both CPs end up sponsoring for large enough a, and in the
process end up worse off than if neither CP had sponsored;
see Figures 5(b) and 5(c). Finally, we note as before that user
surplus is enhanced by sponsorship, more so than in the SN
configuration that emerges when ρ is small; see Figure 5(d).
As before, we prove that when a and ρ are large enough, the
observed equilibrium of the best response dynamics is indeed
a system equilibrium in our duopoly model. Moreover, under
this configuration, neither CP has the incentive to switch their
sponsorship decision on both ISPs.
Theorem 4. Let (a1, a2) = (a, ρa) for ρ ∈ (0, 1). There exist
thresholds aSS and ρSS such that for a > aSS and ρ > ρSS ,
there exists q(a, ρ) such that:
1) q(a, ρ), SS, q(a, ρ), SS) is a system equilibrium. Under
this configuration, neither CP has the unilateral incen-
tive to reverse its sponsorship decision on both ISPs.
Moreover, at least one CP makes a profit less than or
equal to that it would in the absence of the zero-rating
platforms.
2) In the monopoly setting (t → ∞), it is optimal for
each ISP to induce an SS equilibrium by setting its
sponsorship charge equal to q(a, ρ).
The proof of Theorem 4 is presented in Appendix H.
Intermediate ρ : So far, we have seen that:
• For small enough ρ and large enough a, the limiting
configuration under alternating best response dynamics
is SN on both ISPs, which matches configuration under
the monopoly setting.
• For ρ ≈ 1 and large enough a, the limiting configura-
tion under alternating best response dynamics is SS on
both ISPs, which also matches configuration under the
monopoly setting.
It is thus natural to ask what happens for intermediate values
of ρ. In this section, we show that for intermediate values of
ρ, a different type of prisoner’s dilemma can occur between
the ISPs, where both ISPs arrive at an SS configuration, even
though an SN configuration would be better for both ISPs.
To illustrate this most clearly, we set c = 90. Figure 6 shows
the limiting ISP configurations for duopoly and monopoly.
We observe that for a range of ρ, the limiting duopoly
configuration is SS on both ISPs, whereas in the monopolistic
setting, both ISPs prefer an SN equilibrium. This is a different
type of prisoner’s dilemma between the ISPs — it is optimal
for both ISPs to operate an SN configuration. However, in this
state, each ISP has a unilateral incentive to switch to SS, in
order to gain a higher market share. However, once one ISP
switches to SS, the other ISP is also incentivised to switch
to SS to regain its lost market share, resulting in a mutually
sub-optimal equilibrium.
Figure 7 shows surplus of various entities for ρ = 0.8. Note
that ISP surplus is lower than that under the monopoly setting.
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Indeed, CP 1 actually benefits from this prisoner’s dilemma
between the ISPs.
To summarize the key takeaways from this section, we
see that strategic interaction between ISPs, as captured by
alternating best response dynamics, can result in:
• Identical configuration to the monopoly setting. In this
case, the ISPs are not affected by inter-ISP competition.
Both ISPs manage to extract a portion of CP-side surplus,
and at least one CP is worse off due to zero-rating.
• Prisoner’s dilemma between the ISPs. This occurs for (i)
intermediate values of a, with small ρ or ρ ≈ 1, and
(ii) intermediate values of ρ. In this case, the ISPs are
hurt by inter-ISP competition. However, the CPs do not
necessarily benefit even in this case; at least one CP still
ends up worse off due to zero-rating.
V. ASYMMETRIC STICKINESS
In this section, we consider a generalization of the Hotelling
model, where user-stickiness is asymmetric across the two
ISPs. This might capture, for example, the scenario where one
ISP enjoys higher customer loyalty than the other. We show
that while the equilibria of best response dynamics between
the ISPs are qualitatively similar to those in Section IV, the
ISP that enjoys a higher user stickiness benefits more than the
other ISP.
The generalized Hotelling model is parameterized by two
parameters t1 and t2. Under this model, for sponsorship
configurationMj on ISP j, the fraction of subscribers of ISP 1,
denoted xM2M1 , is given by
uM1 − t1x
M2
M1
= uM2 − t2(1− x
M2
M1
).
To ensure a meaningful solution, we assume t1, t2 > u
SS −
uNN . Note that if t1 < t2, users incur a lower transportation
cost to ISP 1 as compared to ISP 2, implying that ISP 1 enjoys
a higher user stickiness than ISP 2.
We simulate the alternating best response dynamics for this
setting, taking t1 = 3, and t2 = 6. As before, ψ(θ) = log(1+
θ). Interestingly, the limiting sponsorship configurations that
emerge from best response dynamics remain symmetric across
the ISPs; see Figure 6c. Moreover, the limiting configurations
are qualitatively identical to the case where user stickiness
is symmetric. Indeed, asymmetry in user-stickiness primarily
manifests in an asymmetry in the market shares of the two
ISPs. To see this, we let (a1, a2) = (a, ρa), and plot the
equilibrium surpluses of the ISPs, CPs, and the user base as
a function of a for ρ = 0.1 (see Figure 8) and for ρ = 0.8
(see Figure 9). We benchmark the observed surplus against the
surplus when (i) neither ISP operates a zero-rating platform,
and (ii) the monopoly setting where each ISP’s market share
is fixed to that under case (i). We observe that
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
(a)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
(b)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
(c)
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
(d)
Fig. 7: Surplus of various entities for c = 90, t = 3, p1 = p2 = 0.35 and ρ = 0.8 as a function of a (a) ISP revenue (b) CP1
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1) As expected, ISP 1 enjoys a higher surplus than ISP 2,
owing to its larger market share.
2) When ρ is small, both ISPs induce an SN equilibrium
for large enough a.
3) When ρ is large, both ISPs induce an SS equilibrium for
large enough a.
4) For intermediate values of a, there is a prisoner’s
dilemma between the ISPs, where they both induce
sponsorship prematurely, resulting in a lower surplus.
Except in this region, the equilibrium sponsorship con-
figurations and surpluses match those in the monopoly
model.
5) At-least one CP, and sometimes both CPs, end up worse
off due to zero-rating.
VI. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSION
The key takeaway from our analyses is the following. When
ISPs lead in setting sponsorship prices, they do in such a
way that a significant fraction of the CP surplus gets paid
to the ISPs in the form of sponsorship costs. This reduces the
CP surplus significantly. Further, if one of the CPs is more
profitable than the other, then ISPs force a configuration in
which the more profitable CP sponsors and the other does
not, skewing the consumption profile of the user base. This
fact does not change with increased capacity of the users to
consume, or when the users are not sticky in their choice of
ISP. Therefore the ISPs have an interest in picking winners
from among the CPs. Interestingly, even the ‘winner’ CP does
not typically benefit in this process! On the other hand, less
profitable CPs can suffer and be eliminated from the market.
In other words, data sponsorship practices grant ISPs con-
siderable market power—indeed, our analysis highlights that
this power is not diminished by inter-ISP competition. Thus
the meta message from our analysis is that the zero rating,
although good for the consumers in the short term because
of the increase in their surplus, could in the long run have
negative consequences on the CP marketplace.
An important observation from our analysis is that zero
rating drives consumption away from non-sponsored con-
tent.12 Indeed, even when the CP profitability is small, ISP
competition induces sponsorship at smaller values of CP-
profitability than in the monopoly case. Since this skew of user
consumption in favor of sponsored content lies at the heart
of the ISP market power, a possible regulatory intervention
(other than disallowing data sponsorship entirely) could be to
limit zero-rated content so as to leave room for non zero-rated
content to also contend for user attention.
It is important at this point to clarify the scope of our model
and our conclusions. Our leader-follower interaction model
assumes the ISP as the leader and the CPs as followers. This is
natural when a ‘large’ ISP operates a zero-rating platform for
‘smaller’ CPs. For example, Sponsored Data from AT&T and
FreeBee Data from Verizon. However, it should be noted that
there are also situations where the dominance is reversed, e.g.,
the interaction between small ISPs and large CPs like Google
and Facebook. Such interactions are typically based not on
data sponsorship, but on peering arrangements, and would
require very different models. Early works on the economics
of Internet peering are [19], [20] while [21], [22], [23], [24]
are some recent works analyzing paid peering.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF RESULTS IN SECTION II
A. Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Recall that user utility for both CPs is same, i.e.,
ψ1(·) = ψ2(·) = ψ(·). From this it is easy to verify that
θNS1 = θ
SN
2 . We will prove the lemma for θ
NS
1 . It is easy to
observe that θNS1 is the maximum solution of the following
concave function over [0, c]:
f(x) = ψ(x) + ψ(c− x) − px (4)
We will prove the lemma by considering the following three
cases:
Case 1: θNS1 < θ
SS
1 . Observe that θ
SS
1 = c/2 is the
maximum of the concave function g(x) = ψ(x) + ψ(c − x)
over [0, c]. By (4), f(x) = g(x) − px. At θSS1 , f
′(θSS1 ) =
g′(θSS1 )− p = −p, which implies that θ
NS
1 < θ
SS
1 .
Case 2: θNS1 < θ
SN
1 . We will show that θ
SN
1 > θ
SS
1 which
combined with Case 1 statement will prove the result. It is
easy to observe that θSN1 is the maximum solution of concave
function h(x) = ψ(x) + ψ(c − x) − p(c − x). Writing it in
terms of optimization function for θSS1 we get h(x) = g(x)−
p(c− x). Thus h′(θSS1 ) = p > 0 implying that θ
SN
1 > θ
SS
1 .
Case 3: θNS1 < θ
NN
1 . Note that θ
NN
1 is the maximum
solution of the concave function d(x) = ψ(x) + ψ(c − x) −
px − p(c − x). By (4) we get f(x) = d(x) + p(c − x) By
similar arguments as Case 1, θNS1 < θ
NN
1 .
B. Nash equilibrium between CPs
We require the following notation.
α1 = 1−
(xM2SN − x
M2
NN)θ
M2
1 + x
M2
NNθ
NN
1
x
M2
SNθ
SN
1
α2 =
(xM2SN − x
M2
NN )θ
M2
1
x
M2
SNθ
SN
1
1{(M2=SN)||(M2=SS)}
β1 = 1−
(xM2NS − x
M2
NN)θ
M2
2 + x
M2
NNθ
NN
2
x
M2
NSθ
NS
2
β2 =
(xM2NS − x
M2
NN )θ
M2
2
x
M2
NSθ
NS
2
1{(M2=NS)||(M2=SS)}
γ1 = 1−
(xM2SS − x
M2
NS)θ
M2
1 + x
M2
NSθ
NS
1
x
M2
SS θ
SS
1
γ2 =
(xM2SS − x
M2
NS)θ
M2
1
x
M2
SS θ
SS
1
1{(M2=SN)||(M2=SS)}
δ1 = 1−
(xM2SS − x
M2
SN)θ
M2
2 + x
M2
SNθ
SN
2
x
M2
SS θ
SS
2
δ2 =
(xM2SS − x
M2
SN)θ
M2
2
x
M2
SS θ
SS
2
1{(M2=NS)||(M2=SS)}
It is not hard to show the following.
Lemma 8. αi, βi, γi, δi ∈ [0, 1] for i = 1, 2.
We are now ready to state the conditions for each sponsor-
ship configuration on ISP 1 to be a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 9. Given a sponsorship configuration M2 on ISP 2,
the conditions for the different sponsorship configurations on
ISP 1 to be Nash equilibrium between the CPs are:
1) NN is Nash equilibrium on ISP 1 if and only if
q1 ≥ max(a1α1 + q2α2, a2β1 + q2β2)
2) SN is Nash equilibrium on ISP 1 if and only if
a2δ1 + q2δ2 ≤ q1 ≤ a1α1 + q2α2
3) NS is Nash equilibrium on ISP 1 if and only if
a1γ1 + q2γ2 ≤ q1 ≤ a2β1 + q2β2
4) SS is Nash equilibrium on ISP 1 if and only if
q1 ≤ min(a1γ1 + q2γ2, a2δ1 + q2δ2)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
[Proof of Statement 1] For fixed a, ρ and p ISP1 will set
q1 which maximizes its revenue. Let the maximum revenue
of ISP1 in M1 sponsorship configuration be r
M1
I (a). By
Lemma 9, maximum revenue of ISP1 in various configurations
is:
rNNI (a) = xNNp(θ
NN
1 + θ
NN
2 ) (5)
rSNI (a) = xSNpθ
SN
2 + xSNaαθ
SN
1 (6)
rSSI (a) = xSSacmin(γ, ρδ). (7)
Note that rNNI (a) is constant with respect to a while r
SN
I (a)
and rSSI (a) are linearly increasing functions of a. Thus there
exists a a = a′ such that rNNI (a
′) = rSNI (a
′). Similarly there
exists a = a′′ such that rNNI (a
′′) = rSSI (a
′′). Therefore for
a < min(a′, a′′) we get max(rSNI (a), r
SS
I (a)) ≤ r
NN
I (a).
Then we set as = min(a
′, a′′) and for any a ≤ as ISP1 will
enforce NN equilibrium by setting q1 ≥ max(aα, aρβ).
[Proof of Statement 2] For a > as, ISP1 will maximize
its revenue as:
rI(a) = max(r
SN
I (a), r
SS
I (a))
= max(xSNpθ
SN
2 + xSNaαθ
SN
1 , xSSacmin(γ, ρδ)).
As both the terms are increasing functions of a, rI(a) is also
an increasing function of a. In this case, ISP1 will select SN
over SS if rSNI (a) ≥ r
SS
I (a). In other words, if xSNpθ
SN
2 +
xSNaαθ
SN
1 ≥ xSSacmin(γ, ρδ) then ISP1 will set q1 = aα
to get SN equilibrium else it will set a1 = amin(γ, ρδ) to get
SS equilibrium.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof. When ISP2 is in NN state, for any transportation cost
t, the market share of ISP 1 in NN state is xNN = 0.5 for any
t. Moreover, by Lemma 1, xSN and xSS are both decreasing
functions of t. Recall the revenue of ISP 1 in NN, SN and SS
state (see (5)-(7)). Hence ISP 1 revenue in NN state rNNI is
independent of t while rSNI and r
SS
I are decreasing functions
of t. Thus a′ such that rNNI (a
′) = rSNI (a
′) is an increasing
function of t. Similarly a′′ such that rNNI (a
′′) = rSSI (a
′′)
is an increasing function of t. This shows that the threshold
aS = min(a
′, a′′) is an increasing function of t.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Proof. [Proof of statement 1] For a ≤ as, by Theorem 1
ISP1 sets NN equilibrium by appropriately choosing q1. Thus
ISP1’s revenue in this case given by (5) which is constant with
respect to a.
[Proof of statement 2] For a > as, by Theorem 1 ISP1
sets SN or SS equilibrium and revenue in both equilibria is
an increasing function of a (see (6) and (7)).
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF LEMMA 7
Proof. [Proof of statement 1] For a > as, ISP1 sets q = aα
to get SN equilibrium. In this case profit of CP1 is:
rSN1 = xSN (a− q1)θ
SN
1 + (1 − xSN )aθ
NN
1
By substituting value of α and simplifying we get,
rSN1 = a(xNNθ
NN
1 + θ1
NN (1− xNN )) = r
NN
1 .
Thus CP1 profit is unaffected while going from NN to SN.
CP2’s profit when ISP1 is in SN configuration is:
rSN2 = xSNaρθ
SN
2 + (1− xSN )aρθ
NN
2 .
Similarly CP2’s profit when ISP1 is in NN configuration is:
rNN2 = xNNaρθ
NN
2 + (1− xNN )aρθ
NN
2 .
By subtracting rNN2 from r
SN
2 and simplifying we get,
rSN2 − r
NN
2 = aρ
[
xSN (θ
SN
2 − θ
NN
2 )
]
≤ 0.
The last inequality follows from Lemma 2. Thus,
rSN2 ≤ r
NN
2 (8)
This proves that CP2 is worse off in SN configuration of ISP1
compared to non-zero rating setting.
[Proof of statement 2] By Lemma 9 to get SS configu-
ration, ISP1 sets q1 = amin(γ, ρδ). Thus we will analyze
profits of CPs in the following two cases:
1) For q1 = aρδ, CP2 profit is:
rSS2 = xSS(ρa− δρa)θ
SN
2 + (1 − xSS)ρaθ
NN
2
= aρ(xSNθ
SN
2 + (1− xSN )θ
NN
2 )
= rSN2 .
By (8) we know rSN2 ≤ r
NN
2 . Thus, r
SS
2 ≤ r
NN
2 making
CP2 worse-off than in NN configuration.
2) For q1 = aγ it is easy to prove that r
SS
1 = r
NS
1 . Now
we will prove that rNS1 ≤ r
NN
1 . We know that
rNS1 = xNSaθ
NS
1 + (1− xNS)aθ
NN
1 ,
and
rNN1 = xNNaθ
NN
1 + (1− xNN )aθ
NN
1 .
By subtracting rNN1 from r
NS
1 we get,
rNS1 − r
NN
1 = axNS(θ
NS
1 − θ
NN
1 ) ≤ 0.
Here last inequality follows from Lemma 2. Thus rSS1 ≤
rNN1 which shows that CP1 is worse-off than in non zero
rating setting in this case.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Consider first the case M = SN ; the case M = NS
follows via a symmetric argument. If SN − SN is a system
equilibrium, it can be shown that a1 ≥ a2; indeed, if not, any
ISP has the incentive to switch to an NS configuration. From
the proof of Theorem 3, it then follows that under an SN-SN
equilibrium, both ISPs would set their sponsorship price as
q = a1
(
1− θ
NN
1
θSN
1
)
.
The profit of the sponsoring CP (CP 1) in this case equals
xSNSNθ
SN
1 (a − q) + (1 − x
SN
SN )θ
SN
1 (a1 − q) = a1θ
NN
1 , which
equals its profit in the absence of zero-rating. Now, profit of
the non-sponsoring CP (CP 2) under this configuration equals
xSNSNa2θ
SN
2 + (1 − x
SN
SN )a2θ
SN
2 = a2θ
SN
2 < a2θ
NN
2 . Thus,
CP 2 is worse off under this configuration, relative to the
scenario where zero-rating is not permitted.
Next, we now considerM = SS. Assume WLOG that a1 ≥
a2. It is easy to show that under a symmetric equilibrium, both
ISPs would set q = a2
(
1− θ
SN
2
c/2
)
. The revenue of CP2 in this
configuration is xSSSS(aρ− q)θ
SS
2 + (1 − x
SS
SS)(aρ − q)θ
SS
2 =
aρθSN2 < a2θ
NN
2 . Thus, when ISPs are in symmetric SS-SS
configuration, CP2 is worse off relative to the setting where
zero-rating is not permitted.
APPENDIX G
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Suppose that ISP 1 and ISP 2 have both induced an SN
state with equal q = q1 = q2. By Lemma 9, to maximize
profit in SN state, ISP 1 would set q1 = aα1+q2α2. Similarly
ISP 2 would set q2 = aα1 + q1α2. For q = q1 = q2 we get,
q = aα11−α2 .
Substituting xSNSN = 0.5 in the expressions for α1, α2
assuming other ISP is in SN state we get,
α1 =
xSNNN (θ
SN
1 − θ
NN
1 )
0.5θSN1
, α2 =
0.5− xSNNN
0.5
.
Substituting these values in expression for q we get,
q = q(a) := a
(
1−
θNN1
θSN1
)
.
We now show that (q(a), SN, q(a), SN) is a system equilib-
rium. The revenue of ISP 1 in this configuration is
rSN1 = x
SN
SN (qθ
SN
1 + pθ
SN
2 )
Noting that θSN2 = c− θ
SN
1 and substituting the value of q in
above expression we get,
rSN1 = 0.5(a(θ
SN
1 − θ
NN
1 ) + p(c− θ
SN
1 )).
By Lemma 2, for a >
pθSN
1
(θSN
1
−θNN
1
)
= aSN , r
SN
1 > 0.5pc.
Now we will show that ISP 1 cannot increase its profit by
switching to a different sponsorship configuration. For this we
need to show that the if ISP 1 moves to NN or SS configuration
given ISP 2 is in SN, then ISP 1’s revenue will not increase
from rSN1 . Let rˆ
NN
1 be ISP 1’s revenue if it moves to NN
configuration given ISP 2 is in SN. Then,
rˆNN1 = x
SN
NNp(θ
NN
1 + θ
NN
2 ) < 0.5pc,
where the last inequality follows from xSNNN ≤ x
SN
SN = 0.5 and
θNN1 + θ
NN
2 ≤ c. Thus for a > as, r
SN
1 > rˆ
NN
1 . So, ISP 1
will not switch to an NN configuration.
Let rˆSS1 be the ISP 1 revenue if it moves to SS configuration
given that ISP 2 is in the SN state. Then, we know that rˆSS =
xSNSS cmin(aγ1+γ2, aρδ1). Note that δ2 = 0 as ISP2 is in SN
state. For small enough ρ, rˆSS = xSNSS caρδ1. Substituting the
appropriate terms for δ1 we get, rˆ
SS
1 = x
SN
SS caρ
(
1− 2θ
SN
22
c
)
.
As θSN2 ∈ [0, c/2) we get rˆ
SS
1 ≤ x
SN
SS aρc. Also c− θ
SN
1 ≥ 0
implying rSN1 ≥ 0.5(a(θ
SN
1 − θ
NN
1 )) thus for
ρ <
0.5(θSN1 − θ
NN
1 )
xSNSS c
= ρSN
we get rSN1 > rˆ
SS
1 .
This proves that (q(a), SN, q(a), SN) is a system equilib-
rium. It is not hard to show that (q(a), SN) is the optimal
configuration for each ISP in the monopoly setting.
Finally, we note that if any CP is to switch its sponsorship
decision on both ISPs, the market split would remain equal.
Therefore, that SN is a Nash equilibrium between CPs in the
monopoly setting implies that neither CP has the incentive to
switch its sponsorship decision on both ISPs.
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Proof. Suppose that ISP 1 and ISP 2 both induce an SS
configuration with q1 = q2 = q. Then by Lemma 9,
q1 ≤ min(aγ1 + q2γ2, aρδ1 + q2δ2). First we will prove that
q1 = aρδ1 + q2δ2 when both ISPs are in SS state. Recall the
expressions for γ1 and δ1 :
γ1 = 1−
(xSSSS − x
SS
NS)θ
SS
1 + x
SS
NSθ
NS
1
xSSSSθ
SS
1
δ1 = 1−
(xSSSS − x
SS
SN )θ
SS
2 + x
SS
SNθ
SN
2
xSSSSθ
SS
2
As utility derived from both CPs is same for a user, xSSNS =
xSSSN , and θ
SS
1 = θ
SS
2 = c/2, thus γ1 = δ1. Similarly, γ2 = δ2.
As ρ < 1, we get q1 = aρδ1+ q2δ2. Simplifying this equation
for q = q1 = q2 we get
q = q(a, ρ) := aρ
(
1−
θSN2
c/2
)
. (9)
Revenue of ISP1 in this state is rSS1 = x
SS
SScq =
0.5caρ
(
1− θ
SN
2
c/2
)
which is a function of a and ρ. Now
we will prove that ISP1 will not move to NN or SN state
from here so as to increase its revenue. Let rˆNN1 be ISP1’s
revenue when ISP2 is in SS which can be written as rˆNN1 =
xSSNNp(θ
NN
1 + θ
NN
1 ). Thus rˆ
NN
1 is independent of a or ρ.
Thus there exists a > an and ρ > ρn such that rˆ
NN
1 < r
SS
1
in which case ISP1 will not move to NN from SS.
Let rˆSN1 be the ISP1 revenue if it moves to SN given ISP2
is in SS. Then, rˆSN1 = x
SS
SN (qSNθ
SN
1 + pθ
SN
2 ) where qSN is
value of q1 for SN state given ISP2 is in SS. By Lemma 9
qSN = aα1 + qα2 where q is given by (9). Substituting value
of qSN and simplifying we get,
rˆSN1 = x
SS
SN (c(aα1 + qα2) + θ
SN
2 (p− aα1 − qα2))
< 0.5(c(aα1 + qα2))
= 0.5ac
(
α1 + ρα2
(
1−
θSN2
c/2
))
,
where inequality holds for any a > p/α1 = as. Comparing
this with rSS1 we can say that if
ρ >
α1
1− α2
1
1−
θSN
2
c/2
= ρn
then rˆSN1 < r
SS
1 . Thus if we choose aSS = max(as, an) and
ρSS = max(ρs, ρn) then ISP1 will not move away from SS
configuration.
The rest of the argument is identical to that in the proof of
Theorem 3.
